Abstract This article is a form of thinking about the future properly regarded as conditional forecasting. It begins by reminding readers of the enormous changes in American medicine since World War II. The second part revisits critically an earlier effort at conditional forecasting for 1995 that Paul Starr and I published in the early 1980s. Besides reviewing the prescience of our forecasts, the second part outlines the earlier trends in progress we identified and the four combinations of political and economic settings we explored. On that basis, the final part takes up the challenge of anticipating sensibly some possible medical futures in the America of the early twenty-first century, a task which excludes simple extrapolation.
sophisticated, and in the absence of countervailing pressures, inevitably more expensive.
How long ago that now seems. By the time of the oil crisis of 1973-74, complaints about the relentlessly increasing costs of medical care had become commonplace. Whether it was the effect of rising Medicare and Medicaid expenditures on government finances or the annual reports that (yet again) medical care inflation would outstrip the general inflation rate in the economy, the threat to American competitiveness caused by increased health insurance premiums or the risk of financial catastrophe faced by the uninsured-all became standard concerns from the 1970s to the early 1990s. Medical care in America came to be regarded as so costly and troubled that in this period assertions of system crisis became increasingly routine.
With the profound changes of the 1990s, the topics of discussion have changed once again. Although we are living in the twilight of the earlier Golden Age, the changes during the 1990s in organizational form, in the sources of power and regulation, and the very shifts in the locus of medical authority have been nothing short of staggering (Kassirer 1997; Peterson 1997) . 1 We have come from the blithe extravagance of the postwar era, with its fee-for-service arrangements that at worst overprovided and overcharged for medical care, to the more tightly regulated insurance plans of the 1990s -labeled "managed care"-that at worst profit by excessively constraining patient choices and physician judgments and incomes. The memory of the period of crisis talk and reform stalematefrom roughly 1970 to 1990 -has for a time been suppressed by the magnitude of changes in the regulation of American medical practices by the recently invigorated private payers (Ginzberg and Ostow 1997) . Given such a disjuncture, the impulse to try to chart the future is practically irresistible. Hence, I respond here to the request of the journal's editor to discuss "how we got here and where we might be going."
A Short Digression on Futurology
Efforts to anticipate the future are ubiquitous -across time, space, and culture. The purposes that motivate predictive efforts are highly varied. For some, the point of forecasting the future is to change it. To imagine what the world might be like is to imagine ways to alter it. Sometimes, this takes the form of jeremiads -honest laments about what, in the absence of determined reform effort, the years to come will be like. For others, futurology is more a tactic in policy warfare. Used that way, predictions easily transform the desirable into the inevitable, as for example, when proponents claim that the recent expansion of managed care indicates both its inevitable predominance and its unquestioned desirability. Likewise, the undesirable can just as easily be converted into the infeasible, as for example, opponents of Canadian-style national health insurance did regularly during the American health reform debates of 1992-93 (Marmor 1994: chap. 12 ). This sort of manipulative futurology is rhetoric dressed up as social science.
There is, however, a more restrained form of futurology. It is simply a form of conditional causal analysis, or exploration of alternative scenarios. Such work can suggest paths of change and stability that a given configuration of forces is likely to produce. In that sense it is applied social science, done prospectively rather than retrospectively.
This essay is an effort of this latter type. Its topic is how to think about the likely shape of American medical care in the first decades of the twenty-first century. I set the stage, however, by reminding readers of the enormous changes in American medicine in the half-century since the end of the second World War. I go on to revisit an exercise in conditional forecasting that Paul Starr and I published in 1984. We were asked then to try to anticipate what American medical care would be like more than a decade later, in 1995. We devoted an entire essay to what we called the "trends in progress" and linked them to four possible combinations of political and economic settings. After reviewing (and seeing the weaknesses of) that earlier forecasting effort, this essay takes up the challenge of anticipating some plausible medical futures in the America of the early twenty-first century.
The most common vice in futurology is simple extrapolation. All of us know about too many failures of even the most sophisticated economic and demographic forecasts to think we can accurately anticipate the structure of institutions and practices even a few years hence. As one economist once put it bluntly, his disciplinary colleagues were able to predict nine of the last three recessions. Why go on with such a difficult task, one might well ask? To do so plausibly means, to my mind, making a sharp distinction between point predictions and conditional forecasts. Point predictions are estimates of what precisely will be the case at some time in the future. Statements of the form "The United States will/will not have universal health insurance in 2005" illustrate the type. By conditional forecasting, I mean statements of the form, "There is high probability that the United States will have universal health insurance if, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, it has a Congress with substantial majorities of liberal Democrats and a combination of low unemployment and a reasonable economic growth rate." If the conditions obtain, the forecast seems very similar to a point prediction. But what the conditional mode emphasizes is the substantial uncertainty we necessarily have about the future. We can neither be sure whether a particular configuration will emerge nor can we anticipate how factors outside our present field will come into play. Put this way, conditional futurology (which can be helpful) seems far more sensible than confident extrapolation and point predictions (which are almost sure to be wrong), even though there are plenty of the latter attempts in the seminars and boardrooms of modern life.
American Medicine in the Period after World War II: An Overview
From 1945 until 1965, American medicine, as noted earlier, enjoyed a golden age for most medical professionals and for many of their patients. For two decades, health expansionism proceeded without a major change in the government's role in financing care. But, in the mid-1960s, that transformation took place, not only with the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, but also with the adoption of programs to increase the number of physicians, to set up community mental health centers and other neighborhood clinics, and in a variety of programs, to redress class and racial inequities. From the late 1960s until the 1970s, there were massive legal efforts to change both the conditions of work and the condition of the environment.
In looking back on the 1970s from the perspective of the 1990s, the striking feature is discontinuity. The economic environment of the early 1970s was a stunningly disappointing reversal of sustained postwar growth. Stagflation ushered in an era of fiscal strain, dampened expectations for social amelioration, and in many instances, generated efforts to cut back (if not do away with) the reform programs and aspirations of the earlier period. In the 1980s there were virtually no major efforts in national politics to extend the coverage of health insurance to all Americans or to transform the fundamental rules of American medicine. But, in the early 1990s, such an effort was made with dramatic flourish in the Clinton administration's proposed Health Security bill. This is not the place to offer an extensive description or appraisal of this unusual episode in medical politics, already certain to become one of the most cited controversies in postwar American politics (Hacker 1997 The forecasting question Paul Starr and I first asked in 1980 was deceptively simple. "What types of changes may we expect to see in the next fifteen years?" But we approached that question with a number of qualifications in mind. We knew that the trends in progress were only the starting point and stressed that forecasting trends "falls short of predicting the future." We emphasized that besides the trends, which could well change, there were "major unpredictable contingencies." And that meant we had to examine "several possible alternative scenarios under varying political and economic conditions" (Starr and Marmor 1984) . 2 And that is precisely what we did. As background to our scenarios, we cited three trends in progress in the early 1980s: the demographic, professional, and organizational developments that would affect the conflicts over cost control and access to care. We noted then that the anticipated aging of the population would increase the inflationary pressures already at work in American medicine. We emphasized that the increased number of women physicians had the potential to change the professional culture of medicine in the direction of more primary care and more compassionate care. And, we highlighted the variable impact of increasing numbers of physicians, suggesting that the result depended on whether the greater supply of doctors took place in traditional fee-for-service settings or in the newly emerging forms of so-called organized care. In fact, we emphasized the institutional consolidation of American medicine and predicted then that it would continue over the next two decades. Beyond that, we called attention to what was obvious to most observers of American medical care in the early 1980s: namely, that the inflationary pressures everywhere in the system also left a large proportion of the population either uninsured or underinsured.
In our thinking about scenarios, we concentrated on two major influences on medical care -the political and economic contexts. Growth or stagnation provided two economic options; liberal or conservative political auspices provided the two political possibilities. Combined, of course, that produced a fourfold set of possible determinants of the future of American medical care.
In 1980, we first asked, what would medical austerity look like if it were overseen by a regime that believed in government efficiency? The tendency under such circumstances, we thought, would be to move toward a more centrally budgeted system along the lines of the British model, although it would surely stop short of a national health service. The great advantage of this system would have been controlling costs by introducing a single national budget for medical care and eliminating the inflationary incentives of the fee-for-service system by paying practitioners on a capitation basis. This model offered the greatest possibility for controlling costs while pursuing the traditional liberal objectives of social equality and public health. This combination of factors, forecasted in 1980, obviously did not come to pass. But that did not make asking the question useless. Indeed, it highlighted what was a low probability future.
Our second question was this: What would happen should a conservative political coalition preside in a time of economic and medical austerity? We claimed to know then that American liberals seek to control costs while bolstering equality, and that American conservatives seek to control costs while limiting state control and preserving the prerogative of private enterprise. For many conservatives, the most attractive reforms involve suppressing demand through greater patient cost-sharing and greater business supervision over (and participation in) management and decision making in the medical care industry.
This scenario of austerity and conservative prominence comes close to characterizing what happened in the early 1980s. The Reagan administration came into office in a time of great economic unrest. It ushered in an era of celebrating "competition" in medicine, getting government off the industry's back, and letting the fresh air of deregulation solve the problems of access, cost, and quality. This picture captured the ideological direction that debates over American medicine took during most of the 1980s-the pushing off the political agenda of universal health insur-ance, and the dismantling of some of the regulatory programs assembled in the 1970s. But it is worth remembering the gap between the procompetition public rhetoric and the reality of efforts to control the government's Medicare and Medicaid costs through administered prices for hospitals by using DRGs and steadily developing tougher fee schedules for physicians.
Medical austerity, however, was but one economic future. We also considered the possibility that a return to relative affluence and rapid economic growth could reduce the clamor for cost controls. In that situation, medical care's future might, we anticipated, shift its focus from how to control costs to how to respond to demands for broader and more secure health insurance coverage.
From the perspective of the early 1980s, we presumed that such an economy would produce very different results under liberal or conservative auspices. Had Democratic liberals presided over an expanding economy, we anticipated that its inclination in health policy would most likely have been a move toward the Canadian system of government health insurance. In a sense, that would have meant resuming the course of development that began in the 1960s with Medicare, a national health insurance system for America's retired designed by liberal reformers. Cost controls under the Canadian option would be less centralized than under the British model. And had the United States followed the Canadian model, American medical professionals would have retained greater autonomy, and the fee-for-service system would have continued for those physicians who preferred it. There was also the possibility of universal coverage accompanied by increased social investment in prevention. These policies, we suggested, might have drawn support from the reform elements within the medical professions, and expanded that class at the same time.
What transpired in the mid-1980s was a brief return to prosperity, presided over by conservative presidential leadership -a version of our fourth possible scenario. Our prediction was this: were conservatives to lead during a period of renewed economic growth, their inclination would be either to celebrate the status quo, or possibly to introduce reforms along the lines of the German model. The German system provides for near-universal health insurance, but under nongovernmental management and public regulation. Many conservative health insurance proposals in America during the late 1980s and early 1990s actually assumed this orientation, although in varying forms. Such an approach, in one sense, would have rounded out America's private health insurance system, just as the Canadian option would have rounded out our public system. Such was the world as it appeared to two analysts of health policy and politics in the early 1980s. Our temptation then was to predict that a conservative ideological orientation would dominate policy debates for some years. But just the opposite prediction could have been made in 1946 or 1966-and in both cases, it would have turned out to be quite wrong. So we ended our forecasting exercise by emphasizing the uncertainty about what configuration of forces would prevail by 1995.
How successful was our forecasting in light of what actually transpired? Did the structure of our analysis hold up even if the precise forecasts differed from the historical record in detail? Or did we miss both what happened and why? If so, that has obvious implications for looking forward now.
A Retrospective Analysis of the Earlier Forecasts
Describing trends in progress during the early 1980s was the least demanding task, one should admit candidly. But the earlier essay was especially accurate in anticipating a continuation of the trend toward consolidation in American medical institutions. On questions of magnitude, the forecasts were sensible about the ambiguity of the effect of increased physician supply on costs. The increased use of market power to constrain physician practices and incomes -anticipated as a possible outgrowth of HMO expansion -has proven in the 1990s to be far more dramatic than we expected. Finally, for trends, we identified the changing position of women in medicine as a potentially profound development, but had no clear idea then about how much the occupational socialization and professional practices would shape women professionals, rather than the other way around. Still, the setting out of trends in progress seems on balance -to this self-interested reviewer at least -as a helpful starting point for someone in the early 1980s thinking about the future of American medicine fifteen years hence.
It might be useful to remember what the less restrained extrapolators had been predicting throughout the mid-to late 1970s. The growth of national and regional hospital chains prompted some to anticipate a simple takeover in due course of the community nonprofit hospital at least by chains, if not by for-profit chains. In that period, Hospital Corporation of America and Humana were the rage in the investment community. For others -especially for the advocates of reform who stressed vertical and horizontal integration as the panacea for inefficiency in American medicine -the future was going to be one of far-reaching consolidation. As Paul Ellwood repeatedly predicted in the 1970s, American medicine would be dominated by six or seven national firms, vertically integrated from insurance to tertiary care. 3 It was a vision of competing giants, massive firms on the scale of MCI or Sprint or Nynex, serving national customers a menu of health services. Needless to say, vertical integration of this sort is not the kind of consolidation that became dominant in the 1990s. Humana, for example, unsuccessfully tried this course of action and pulled back into the delivery of hospital and related services. Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) went through its own turbulent growth, merged with the expansionary Columbia system, and in 1997, found itself in enormous economic and legal difficulties. In short, the futuristic vision of huge, vertically integrated firms is an object lesson in the limits of extrapolation.
The next issue, quite obviously, is whether the fourfold presentation of possible futures proved helpful. Here, the picture is considerably more mixed. The combination of economic austerity and liberal Democratic political control did not come to pass. Likewise, in the Reagan and Bush years, there was no obvious combination of conservative political domination and either recession or a spurt of growth. To be sure, Republicans controlled the White House, but, (except intermittently) did not have unified party control of Congress as well. Certainly, there was enormous economic dislocation in the early 1980s. And there was improvement in the latter part of the decade, but never a transformative political coalition of the right or the left. So, we were more simple-minded about political auspices than we should have been. Unified national government has turned out to be the rare American circumstance in the postwar period. That is, there have seldom been periods of ideological and partisan compatibility between the president and the majority of both houses of Congress -circumstances like those in 1964, when President Johnson won in a landslide election and had an overwhelming majority of likeminded Democrats in Congress to enact much of his agenda. President Reagan, by contrast, had a Democratic Congress for most of his tenure; although he was able to push through important tax and spending changes in the early 1980s, as we only partly anticipated under that scenario, there were no major transformations of either private medicine or the public programs like Medicare and Medicaid.
The remaining option was liberal political control amidst a buoyant economy. That never happened. A fusion of the economic circumstances of 1994-1997 with the agenda of the campaign Clinton ran in 1992 might have justified this description. But the Clinton presidency, unlike the campaign for it, cannot be plausibly described as liberal. Moreover, the overall political circumstances of the 1990s, like those of the 1980s, were ones of mixed government. American politics was not stalemated on all issues by any means, but was hedged in by enough fundamental differences to make major reform in health care highly unlikely. What remains, then, are the limits of our fourfold conception of possible contexts in American politics. While illuminating as a set of possibilities, it missed what turned out to be political reality for most of the period. That context was one of oscillation from mixed government without an ideological domination of liberals or conservatives to, as in 1994-1996, a sharp shift in the ideological composition of Congress that brought with it neither the capitulation of the Democratic president nor election of a Republican president in 1996. So far, then, there is much to be said for the importance of unanticipated events (and contexts), a reminder we acknowledged in the original article, but that was not emphasized enough in our conditional predictions.
Looking Forward, or What One Might Expect in the First Decades of the Twenty-first Century
The preceding discussion should be enough to make even the most confident prognosticator hesitant. And, indeed, that is precisely what has happened in the course of revising this article for publication. My conclusions about futurology in 1997 turned out to be even more skeptical than what we expressed in 1984. Conditional forecasting is still surely better than simple extrapolation. But neither is able to deal with the enormous uncertainty that remains about the configuration of economic circumstance, political setting, and unexpected events and actions. So, what then is to be said?
The case against simple extrapolation remains valid and is all the more worth reviewing because such extrapolation is both rampant and seductive. One continues to observe the widespread tendency to take the present as the basis for anticipating what the future will be. Moreover, given this uncertainty, there is an understandable human tendency to follow the lead of those who claim that they have expertise that justifies their speaking assertively about the future. Sensible futurology continues to require a critique of unjustified extrapolation and its accompanying rhetoric.
Looking toward the Twenty-first Century: Misleading Images, Possible Futures
Three developments in the 1990s have had a profound (and misleading) effect on the discussion of American medicine and its future. One is the spread of what is conventionally called "managed care." A second is the growth in appeals to global economic developments as guides to medicine's future. And the third to which I want to draw attention is the appeal to managerial theory and jargon -from "integrated delivery systems" to information systems to organizational consolidation -as sources of resolution for the tensions in modern medical care. Each development has its extrapolators and many of the extrapolators regard their projected future with the enthusiasm regularly revealed by purveyors of panaceas.
The spread of "managed care" enjoyed a marketing boom in the first half of the 1990s. Although the Clinton health reform collapsed in 1994, audiences have been repeatedly (and rightly) told that change in American medicine has taken place at a breathtaking pace ever since. Managed care -the world of medical networks, competing plans, and complex choices -has shaken up the medical lives of Americans to a degree and in ways that no one predicted even a few years ago. According to promoters, these changes promise major benefits in getting more value for money in the American medical care industry.
But what is one to make of these claims about managed care? One 1997 article -entitled "The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s"-illustrates the ambiguity of what is actually going on (Jensen et al. 1997 ). "Managed care isn't coming," the authors rhetorically emphasize, "it has arrived." But, one might reasonably ask, to what precisely does the "it" refer? And, beyond that, does it make any meaningful sense to describe the referents as managed care? The survey ignores any conceptual discussion of what is meant by "managed care." Instead, it simply announces that "nearly three-quarters of U.S. workers with health insurance now receive their coverage through a health maintenance organization (HMO), a preferred provider organization (PPO), or a point-of-service plan"-and all of these are then labeled managed care plans. In fact, what has arrived without a doubt are these new corporate forms of health finance organizations. But adding the expression "managed care" tells us nothing additional about who manages what or how. Moreover, the understanding of these developments is blocked, not enhanced, by the connotations of "managed care." For the trends actually described by the article show not managerial innovations so much as convergence in benefit structure, and patient cost-sharing among these "insurance products."
This survey also illustrates the dramatic changes in the very language used to describe American medical care. Increasingly, that language reflects the conventions of American corporate life, not those of either traditional physicians or biomedical scientists. Sometimes Madison Avenue exaggeration accompanies the antigovernment rhetoric of free markets and beneficent competition. This style of discourse is nicely illustrated by the chief executive of the Cigna insurance company at a 1995 conference on health care. Reform at the national level failed, Larry English said, but there was nevertheless an extraordinary "revolution" underway in American medicine. Market-based change would transform the medical cottage industry of the past into a competitive, cost-effective marvel of the future. Indeed, the free market would be the "toughest" regulator and would produce "better care and lower costs," English concluded, if only it were allowed to do so with minimal government interference (Marmor and Mashaw 1995) . Cigna, like Aetna, he said, would be in the forefront of change as "managed care" firms, not as health insurance companies.
"Managed care" is an expression that implies both competence and concern. It epitomizes the use of persuasive definitions in the new language of corporate medical care. Managed care in practice has mostly meant cutting back on payment levels, medical choices, and covered services -sometimes wisely, sometimes not. It has been largely the "managing" of costs, not the micromanaging of care. None of the developments in PPOs, HMOs, or POSs noted in the 1997 survey emphasize the management of care, the finding of new modes of organizing services, or different ways of motivating providers or patients to improve health. Heralded in 1995, questioned increasingly in 1996 and after, the short-term future of these organizations involves regulatory battles in the states about what can and cannot be rationed by the policies of private firms.
The shift in language fashions has truly been extraordinary. Marketing firms generate cute but misleading labels for health firms to catch the eye of potential enrollees. So, for example, we find a health maintenance organization called Maxicare, when the obvious incentives of such organizations are to restrain rather than to "maximize" the use of medical services. The labels now come from a remarkably different set of sources than we appreciated in the early 1980s. This is obvious in the case of medical care quality. Executives of insurance firms advertise the wonders of "medical report cards" that claim to sort out the good from the bad among hospitals and doctors.
Orwellian doublespeak and the exaggerations of American management commentators are hardly new to American audiences. Numerous management theories have been developed, marketed, applied, and then abandoned as ways to deal with familiar problems in the organization of medical care provision. Two decades ago, HMOs were celebrated as the antidote to fee-for-service's inflationary pressures. Decentralization was in vogue for a time, as were health planning agencies, to decide what was needed medically in local areas. More recently, management fashions have shifted to "total quality management," "integrated delivery systems," and the promise of the "information age." Some years big is better and the emphasis is on synergy, economies of scale, and coordinated or unified central management. A few years later, small is beautiful: downsizing, decentralization, and divestiture become the buzzwords of management strategy. At the time of this writing (1997), there is again considerable emphasis on "consolidation," shifts from nonprofit to for-profit forms, and management by performance measures.
These slogans are less for the broad public than for other managers, the ones who decide which health plans their employees can join. What we have is the language of Madison Avenue linked to the managerial jargon of American business schools. And just as the rhetoric of fee-forservice medicine obscured the dangers of overproviding and overcharging for medical care in earlier periods, so does managerial medicine mask the dangers of its key features: bureaucratic and financial constraints on patient choice and physician judgment and the consequences of this constraint for the loss of professional morale and patient trust.
The difficulty with sloganeering lies not only in increasing the likelihood of future disappointments but also in the confusion that the language of marketing can sow if it is not seen for what is. (The same sloganeering can arise from public sources, too.) 4 There could, of course, be a very substantial but unintended consequence. Over time, the gap between what Americans expect and what they experience could become a catalyst for change. If and when they experience troublesome realities behind the advertising hype, more Americans may come to reject medical care being marketed to them in misleading terms. The complexities of choosing amid the jumble of competing claims have already provoked demands for simpler and more protected choices. Indeed, the fears generated by the changes of the 1990s may well be the impetus for pushing health care back toward the top of the nation's political agenda very soon. But it will take political sponsorship to do so. The underlying pressures are already present in the widespread critiques of recent changes in the rules of American medicine. Yet the frustrations that the initial Clinton campaign for health care reform brought out had been present for years before any presidential candidate was able to give it vigorous expression. As John Kingdon emphasized years ago, large changes in public policy occur when there is a convergence of special opportunities, accepted problems, and available policy responses (Kingdon 1984) .
Alleged Worldwide Developments as the Predictors of the Future
A second source of confusion and futuristic overconfidence is the increased appeal to international experience as a guide to the future. It is impossible, as Rudolf Klein noted, to escape the "bombardment of information about what is happening in other countries" (Klein 1997) . But there is an extraordinary gap between the magnitude of the information flows and the capacity to interpret or learn useful lessons from them. Indeed, I suspect that the speed of communication about developments abroad has actually reduced the likelihood of credible cross-national learning.
There is little doubt about the salience of health care policy on the public agendas of each of our nations-and, indeed, on the agendas of most industrial democracies. The puzzle is not whether there is such widespread interest in health care policy, but why now. And why has international evidence (arguments, claims, or caricatures) seemed more prominent in this period of "reform" than, say, during the fiscal strains of the early 1970s?
There is a simple answer to this question: medical care policy has come to the forefront of public agendas for quite obvious reasons. First, financing personal medical care has everywhere become a major component of the budgets of mature welfare states, and when fiscal strain arises-especially from prolonged recession-policy scrutiny is the pre-dictable result. Second, under almost all circumstances, mature welfare states have come to have less capacity for bold fiscal expansion into new areas. This means that managing existing programs has necessarily consumed a larger share of the public agenda. Third, there has been what might be termed the wearing out (or perhaps the wearing down) of the postwar consensus about the welfare state. By that I mean the effects of more than two decades of fretting about the affordability, desirability, and governability of the welfare state.
Starting in earnest during the 1973 -74 oil shock, sustained by stagflation, and bolstered by electoral victories of parties opposed to welfare state expansion, critics assumed bolder postures and the public increasingly heard challenges to programs that had for decades seemed sacrosanct. From Mulroney to Thatcher, from New Zealand to the Netherlands -the message of necessary change was heard. Accordingly, when economic strain reappears, the inner rim of programmatic protection -not interest group commitment, but social faith -is weaker and the incentives to explore transformative but not fiscally burdensome options become relatively stronger. That, I would suggest, helps to explain the international pattern of welfare state review -including health policyover the past decade. And, further, times of policy change sharply increase the demand for new ideas-or at least for new means to old ends.
Yet, as Klein reminds us, policy learning in practice is not so much about transferring ideas as it is about adapting them to local circumstances. It is that central fact that makes so unrealistic the efforts of institutions like the World Bank (1993) to promote all-purpose models of health policy supposedly applicable to all countries. "Worldwide forces" may well be at work, but the shape of American medical care (or that of any other nation) cannot be deduced from them. The very "process of naturalizing foreign experience," Klein (1997) notes, tends also to transform it into forms that are suitable for the national environment. The vocabulary may be international, but the "way in which [ideas are] translated into policy remains national." 5
Management Technique Is Not a Panacea
The proliferation of management techniques is the third trend in progress that prompts misleading extrapolation and misplaced confidence. As we operate in a world often characterized by management rhetoric and enthusiasm for market competition, we would be wise to remember the remarkably cyclical history of such enthusiasms. The heralded initiatives of one era have regularly given way to the enthusiasms of the next. It is worth recalling that almost every management innovation of the last half-century launched itself with high hopes and inflated rhetoric, only to be abandoned later without much admitted regret. Better understanding of why the world of management commentary produces such cycles of enthusiasm followed by declarations of failure will probably never prevent the distribution of the managerial equivalent of snake oil. But some realism about what management can and cannot accomplish might guard against the more unrealistic predictions of innovation and also help moderate disappointment at the fact that good management cannot and will not rid societies of their medical care problems. 6 There is great danger in believing that managerial techniques are the equivalent of solutions. The point here is quite simple. The issue of good management is not what slogan medical administrators decide to bandy about, but how well managers balance the demands prompted by the multiple purposes of health institutions. The demands of institutions like hospitals and clinics are contradictory and shifting. They have multiple tasks that require different organizational structures and techniques-in short, different managerial approaches. Furthermore, managerial technique is intimately related to the existence of multiple objectives: every upside has a downside. As we confront the private regulations that "managed care" organizations employ, we should reflect not only on what may be lost as well as gained, but also on the countervailing reactions that will be increasingly provoked. Whether the technique is preapproval for specialist care or hospitalization, or movement to a staff-model HMO for providing services, medical organizations have in the 1990s increasingly concentrated on eliminating unnecessary physician-patient encounters, diagnostic procedures, surgical interventions, and pharmaceutical prescriptions. The bureaucratic routines necessary for these activities may well control costs for some firms, but the loss of patient and physician autonomy, and control over quality, and the increase in profit-driven innovations, are significant and already provoking countervailing pressures.
566 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 6. One reader wondered why management fads rise and fall so dynamically. With powerful interests backing particular notions, why do these interests not settle on a formulation that serves their purposes and stick with it? The short answer to this question is simple: the changing fortunes of firms in turbulent times, whatever the cause, require continually changing explanations. Moreover, to the extent that new ideas play a motivating role in organizations, the incentives to acquire ever-new ones does not decline.
Deeply embedded in managerial theory is the ambivalence concerning the efficacy of technological versus cultural solutions to organizational problems. Ever since "Taylorism" provoked a reaction based on that particular model's desire to treat people and machines as interchangeable, theorists have oscillated between recommendations based on structures, processes, and technologies and those based on learning, motivation, and culture. One cannot sensibly decide which managerial strategy to believe in because both work some of the time, but not all of the time.
The same is true in reorganizing America's medical care system. It is hard to believe that a cultural approach will be attractive from the standpoint of cost containment. Cost control in practice is about information systems, statistical testing, and economic rewards for scientifically determining what works or what is cost effective. On the other hand, in a medical world increasingly dominated by large organizations, Americans are likely to want to retain the cultural vision of Marcus Welby -doctor, counselor, and friend. Demands will continue for some internal structures that emphasize professional autonomy, team effort, group responsibility for care, and patient involvement in an overall culture of "wellness." Our managerial arrangements may work at cross purposes with the technocracy of cost containment confronting the professional culture of patient care. The trick of good management -in the future as in the past -will be to balance these perspectives in ways that cope with our conflicting purposes and inconsistent desires. And, as Deborah Stone and Gary Belkin emphasize, there is a terrific tension for physicians between their role as professionals, giving care without regard to financial considerations, and demands that they be businesslike in considering both economic and medical issues in their decisions (Stone 1997; Belkin 1997) .
Preparing for the Multiple Futures
How, then, should the sensible prognosticator proceed? Can we assess how broader currents of change in American society impinge on the trends in progress within medicine? Can we predict what types of change-external to medicine-one could expect to see over the next decade or so?
Our temptation in 1980 was to predict that conservative ideology would dominate policy debates for the foreseeable future. The same was true for many soothsayers in 1994. But just the opposite ideological prediction would have been made in 1946 or 1966-and in both cases, it would have turned out to be quite wrong. Moreover, the scenarios we projected earlier also failed to anticipate the major reform actions of the period: both the ambitious but stalemated Clinton proposal, and the dramatic increase in nongovernmental reform. It follows then that very hesitant anticipation is all one can reasonably have. The medical world of the next decade is strikingly uncertain, one for which a remarkable number of "futures" could plausibly be forecasted and defended. Simple extrapolation into the future based on recent history has already been shown to be misguided (Ginzberg and Ostow 1997) . Instead, we have to be prepared for a multiplicity of different futures.
The Medical World of the Next Decade Is Uncertain
The first requirement, then, is to imagine what those multiple futures might be. The second is to sort out what these possible futures mean, both for analysts of American medical care and for those responsible for health institutions.
Will governmental health reform disappear from the national agenda? That seems unlikely under almost any combination of political and economic circumstances. But while the changes of the 1990s have made certain that regulatory issues will continue to arise, both in Congress and in the states, the direction of their political resolution is by no means clear. National stalemate could easily coexist with radical state reforms.
Would a continuation of economic growth into the next century dramatically alter my predictive hesitancy? Here, the answer at the end of the century is very different from what seemed plausible amidst the economic strain of the early 1980s. The context of national politics appears to have been transformed by the commitment to balanced budgets over the foreseeable future. Just as the fiscal requirements of the European Monetary Union constrain national governments from Britain to Belgium and from Spain to Sweden, so do the terms of the 1997 budget agreement restrict the ambitions of any new American administration. It is, of course, possible that growth will prove so dynamic that the budget deal will not be the straitjacket it now appears. But that in turn is highly improbable.
The picture of the future in 1997 was one of turbulence, hard-to-chart adjustments, and little prospect of dramatic policy reform. Even if the economy grows at a healthy rate, the fiscal constraints will most likely remain. There is little reason to expect a major departure from the pattern of divided government we have seen for most of the period since World War II. That does not mean stasis in policy. Rather, it means that dramatic, transformative shifts are less likely than marginal adjustments. By marginal adjustments, I mean changes in the rules of Medicare that began in the summer of 1997, or continued restrictions on the autonomy of health care plans, and incremental increases in who is covered by Medicare or Medicaid. Modest changes over time can, of course, add up to transformations. And, there is no denying the possibility of situational factors -of leadership, context, and happenstance -that could end up causing large programmatic changes. There is a good case for claiming that American political processes exhibit both "incrementalism and rapid policy change" (Hacker 1997) . For a very wide range of policies, there "are long periods of stability in public policy understandings punctuated by short periods when dramatic changes take place" (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 57) . Scholars should be able to anticipate ideological inclinations, but the conditions that prompt dramatic change do not appear to be predictable.
The implications of such futuristic caution are very different, however, for those practicing in the institutions of American medical care. With such great uncertainty about what the future might bring, the sensible posture seems quite clear. Whatever the immediate pressures, act to the extent possible on the basis of core medical values that could be defended in quite varied contexts.
By core values in medicine, I mean the following: (a) use the least costly means to arrive at any given medical effect; (b) use ability to benefit as a rationing device, where necessary, rather than ability or willingness to pay, or some other nonmedical criterion; (c) make a determined effort to avoid doing harm in the interests of institutional fame, research experimentation, and organizational marketing; and (d) more generally, apply not only the cost-effectiveness test of (a), but use in a commonsensical way the benefit-cost test for selecting what to do and to whom. In practice, that means not only avoiding sheer waste (activities with no known benefit) and fraud (seeking payment for tasks not done), both of which may be lucrative but wrong. It also means encouraging the doing of more important things first and of less important things second or not at all.
The prudent and resourceful reformer faces other imperatives under the conditions of uncertainty we have highlighted. Every method of payment, oversight, and sanctioning has the vice of its virtues. The virtuous and successful agent of change, accordingly, would attend to the inherent vices of any system of financing or provision. Consider, for illustrative purposes, the medical executive considering both fee-for-service and capitation methods of reimbursement for different client groups. Prudence requires anticipating that fee-for-service payment prompts overprovision and that capitation prompts the opposite. Institutional review, then, should anticipate the risks of both dangers. Institutional prudence suggests having salaried physicians oversee patterns of care provided under fee-for-service terms, and having fee-for-service physicians monitor the patterns of care given capitated patients. These suggestions, quite obviously just examples, are nonetheless the opposite of trying to maximize financial gain under differing systems of finance and provision. 7 From this perspective, managed care initiatives already underway should be evaluated (and where possible, restructured) to pursue these core medical values. The emphasis on assuring cost-effective care should surely continue. But the administrative hassles, attempts at cost shifting, and other impediments to quality care that many in the medical care community associate with the managed care movement will continue to be challenged. In short, the institutions that call themselves managed care plans will be charged with living up to their promises of sensible and effective care -care that upgrades the average quality now available for most patients. The managers who achieve these goals will flourish under any set of assumptions.
The reform struggles of the 1990s have been and will continue to be substantively complex, politically conflictual, and conceptually befuddling (Ginzberg and Ostow 1997) . Health care is in an ever-changing state, driven in the mid-1990s by the frenzy of large-scale mergers and acquisitions, like that of U.S. Healthcare and Aetna. But the very market forces that produced such turbulence will unsettle the deals struck. And the task of anticipating the future of American medical care will become even harder than it was in past decades.
